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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
SARAH MARGARET DeWEESE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
8347

J. C. PENNEY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for
a fall in the entranceway of the J. C. Penney store at 213
South Main Street in Salt Lake City on November 30,
19 53. The case was tried before a jury in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, with the Honorable Martin M. Larson
presiding. After plaintiff had introduced her evidence
and rested, the court reserved its ruling on defendant's
motion for an invoiuntary dismissal. After defendant
had introduced its evidence, the court reserved its ruling
on defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The case
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was submitted to the jury, a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant was returned by them in
the amount of $10,000.00, and judgment was entered accordingly. Thereafter, defendant moved the court for a
new trial or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict
and enter judgment in accordance with its motion for a
directed verdict theretofore reserved by the court. These
motions were both denied by the court.
Sarah Margaret DeWeese was 27 years old at the time
of the trial. On November 30, 1953, she left her home
at 1275 Emerson Avenue in Salt Lake City to go to town
to do some shopping and to meet her husband who was
scheduled to get off work between 9:15 and 9:30 P.M.
Her husband, Hugh DeWeese, was Assistant Manager of
the W. T. Grant store located at 241 South Main Street
in Salt Lake City. She was wearing regular winter apparel but was not wearing any galoshes or overshoes.
(R. 17). She caught the bus at 13th East and Emerson
Avenue at 8:00 P. M. and at that time the weather was
fair, with no precipitation. After she had traveled about
one block or maybe a block and one-half snow began to
fall in large flakes, melting before it hit the ground. She
got off the bus at 2nd South and State Streets and the
weather was the same but there was no snow on the
ground. The sidewalks were damp and wet but not wet
enough for any water to be running on them (R. 18) and
there were no puddles unless there was a break in the sidewalk. (R. 35) She went directly to the J. C. Penney
store.
The floor of the entrance to the store consisted of
terrazzo and she entered from the north side. (R. 19-20)
She noticed the floor was wet and muddy and footprints
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or streaks from people walking in and out. (R. 20, 39)
There was no water puddled or running (R. 42) but she
never thought about it being slick or anything of that
nature. (R. 20) She was not looking up or down. (R. 30)
The entrance was lighted and she could see where she was
going. (R. 28) She was from two to five feet from the
sidewalk when her right foot went forward and her left
leg folded under her and she fell. A customer helped her
up and she went into the store. She called her husband
at the W. T. Grant store and he came to defendant's
store immediately. A Mr. Davies, an employee of the
store, arrived and asked her if there were any mats in the
entrance. She told him no and he went out to the entrance, returned and got a bucket and went outside and
put what appeared to be Feldspar on the entranceway.
The accident occurred around 8:15 or 8:20 P.M. She
was in the J. C. Penney store approximately 15 to 20 minutes and went from there toW. T. Grant's store. (R. 2122) When she went out of the store there were no mats
in the entranceway.
The entranceway where plaintiff fell had a slope of
4 inches to 10 feet. The sidewalk in front of the store
had a slope of 5.5 inches to 10 feet. (R. 29) She left W.
T. Grant's store with her husband between 9:15 and 9:30

and the weather and the sidewalks were about the same
as when she fell.
Over objection of the defendant, plaintiff's husband
was allowed to testify that he married plaintiff on November 4, 1950 in Roanoke, Virginia. He had been raised
there and was first employed in Postal Service at the age
of 18, subsequently going to the U. S. Army, attending
college and then returning to the Post Office, after which
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he went to work as a Trainee Manager for W. T. Grant
Company. (R. 66-67) With W. T. Grant Company he
had duties to perform in connection with the maintenance
and upkeep of the entrances to the store, which were of
terrazzo. Thereafter he worked for the same company in
Greensboro, North Carolina, Richmond, Virginia, Williamsburg, Virginia, Winchester, Virginia, Newport News,
Virginia, Atlanta, Georgia and Salt Lake City, at all of
which places they had terrazzo entranceways and he had
duties relative to the upkeep and maintenance of the same.
(R. 67-70)
On the 30th day of November, 1953, the following
precipitation amounting to .02 inches was received in Salt
Lake City:
((Light rain started at 8:12P.M., ended at 8:34P.M.
Very light rain started at 9:15 P.M., ended at 9:31
P.M.
Light rain started at 9:31, ended at 10:59 P.M.
Light snow started at 10:45 P.M., ended at 11:00
P.M.
Very light rain started at 10:59 P.M., ended at
11:35 P.M.
Very light snow started at 11:05 P.M., ended at
11:3 6 P.M." (Exhibit 4-P).
The temperature on November 30th was a maximum of 62 and a minimum of 39, which maximum tied
the previous record for this day and was the warmest
November since records began in 1874. On the 30th of
November, 1953 there was only a trace of precipitation at
9 o'clock and a trace is an amount too small to measure.
(Ex. 5-D)
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE
TRIAL TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IMPROPER
EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL.

POINT I.
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE
TRIAL TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.

Plaintiff predicated her right to recover solely upon
the following two allegations of negligence contained in
the complaint:
(((a) That defendant constructed the entranceway to its store with a terrazzo surface and
on an inclining plane at a time when it well knew,
or should have known, that said surface had the
propensity of becoming slick and slippery when
wet.
(( (b) Defendant failed and neglected to place
any abrasives or rubber matting on said entranceway at a time when it well knew, or should have
known, that said entranceway had become slick
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and slippery as a result of inclement weather."
(R. 2)
There was no evidence introduced at the trial in support of the first allegation and the court did not submit
such a question to the jury. The mere fact that an incline or slope existed cannot sustain any charge of negligence. However, the only evidence introduced at the
trial showed that the slope was in fact less than that of
the sidewalk itself in front of and adjoining the entranceway. The general rule is well stated in Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Revised Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 798,
page 1824:
uBut there is no inherently dangerous construction merely because the marble floor of an
entranceway to a store has a slanting or sloping
surface."
One of plaintiff's witness also testified that this typ~
of entrance was in common use to the extent of approximately 80% of the business establishments on Main Street.
The duty of care controlling in this case has been
fully set out by this court. In Jenson v. S.H. Kress &
Compa.ny, 87 Ut. 434, 49 P.2d 958 (1935), this court
held that a storekeeper's duty was to exercise ordinary
care and diligence to provide and maintain a reasonably
safe place of business for its customers and to exercise
the same degree of care ana diligence to prevent injury
to them and to their property while they are lawfully
in its place of business or on the premises. This court
also held that a storekeeper is not an insurer of the safety
of its customers. This rule of law has been reaffirmed by
this court in the case of Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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------------------ U t. ___________________ , 2 32 P.2d 210, 31 A.L.R.2d
177, where the court said:
llt

n·
;u.

~

u::- )(- ::- In the instant case the appellant can
only be liable if the terrazzo floor when wet subjected business visitors to an unreasonable risk and
the appellant either knew or by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered that such a
condition existed. ::- * *"

ol

on·
an

liD!

Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to
plaintiff, we respectfully submit that reasonable minds
could not differ that the floor upon which plaintiff fell
did not subject her to an unreasonable risk and that the
defendant did not know, and by the exercise of reasonable care could not have discovered, that any hazard existed.
First and foremost, the record does not support the
charge that the entranceway had become slippery. Mrs.
DeWeese stated:
etA. I was just walking along normally, minding
my own business, and I noticed the floor was
wet, but never thought about it being slick
or anything like that.

ttQ. And what happened?
etA. And the next thing I knew, I was down after
I had gone two or three feet ip.side the entrance." ( R. 2 0)
Mr. Caffall, one of the plaintiff's witnesses, testified
that he did not test the terrazzo at J. C. Penney's for
slipperiness when it was wet. (R. 100) He also testified
that a lot of differences existed in various terrazzo (R. 95)
and that terrazzo when wet was just about as slippery as
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the sidewalk. All of plaintiff's evidence introduced in an
attempt to show possible slipperiness was related to the
terrazzo in front of W. T. Grant's store or in theW. T.
Grant's stores in Roanoke, Virginia, Greensboro, North
Carolina, Richmond, Virginia, Williamsburg, Virginia,
Winchester, Virginia, Newport News, Virginia and Atlanta, Georgia. As will be hereinafter pointed out, the
terrazzo or its condition in the entranceways to these
other stores was inadmissible and had no probative value
relative to the terrazzo in front of the defendant's store.
Admittedly, Mr. DeWeese testified that he almost fell,
but he was in a hurry and he was not walking in a normal
manner nor as his wife had been walking, nor in the same
place.
The only affirmative evidence introduced relevant
to the terrazzo in the entranceway of defendant's store
was by the defendant, whose witness, Dr. Harris, testified
from actual measurements made of the static and kinetic
coefficients of friction of the terrazzo where Mrs. DeWeese fell. This testimony was to the effect that, first,
it was not more slippery when wet than dry; second, it
was less slippery when worn, and, third, it was about as
slippery when wet as the sidewalk in front of the store.
(R. 110-119)
Reasonable minds cannot differ in concluding that
defendant did not know, nor by the exercise of reasonable care could it have discovered, any alleged hazardous
condition.
The time element in this case is startling. This accident, by plaintiff's own testimony, happened around 8:15
or 8:20 P.M. Her husband corroborated this by his testimony. After plaintiff had fallen, been helped up, had
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gone into defendant's store and then called her husband
at W. T. Grant's store, he arrived at J. C. Penney's store
between 8:15 and 8:30 P.M. Plaintiff also introduced the
weather report, showing: "Light rain started at 8:12P.M.,
ended at 8:34 P.M." (Ex. 4-P)
Plaintiff's testimony that it had begun to snow shortly after she boarded the bus at 13th East and Emerson, is
not inconsistent, for this court can take judicial notice
that precipitation could have begun at the higher elevation
of 13th East before any precipitation began in town. The
only evidence of any precipitation in town other than
the weather report was plaintiff's testimony of precipitation during the time it took her to walk from 2nd South
and State Streets to defendant's store, less than a block
and a half away.
The month of November had been the warmest
November since weather records began in 1874. No precipitation had fallen during the previous five days, and, in
fact, only five days out of the entire month showed any
precipitation at all. (Ex. 5-D) The uncontroverted evidence is that on the evening Mrs. DeWeese fell precipitation began at 8:12 P.M., with just a trace falling from
that time until 8:34 P.M. The weather report shows all
precipitation to be very light and intermittent, and Mrs.
DeWeese properly categorized it as a ((mist," (R. 36) certainly not enough to cause the sidewalks to run water or
collect puddles, and the only moisture in defendant's
covered foyer was placed there during a period of not less
than three nor more than eight minutes prior to plaintiff's fall and consisted of streaks or marks from people's
feet. These did not extend into the store beyond where
Mrs. DeWeese fell.
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We submit that to hold a store owner to a standard
of care imposing constructive notice or knowledge of a
purportedly but not proven slippery condition in a covered entranceway, which could not have been in existence
for more than approximately five minutes, is unreasonable and would in effect require that defendant be an insurer of its customers' safety. Such a rule is contrary to
the law in this state and the overwhelming rule of law
in the United States. Jenson v. S. H. Kress Co., supra;
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., supra.
The Supreme Court of Washington in Knopp, etal. v.
Kemp & Hebert, 74 P.2d 924, (S.Ct. Washington, 1938),
in affirming a judgment on a directed verdict for the
defendant department store, declared:
u* ~- * At any event, there is evidence that the
sidewalk in front of the store was wet and some of
the slush or water had slopped over on the terrazzo
floor where it joined the cement sidewalk. As Mrs.
Knopp stepped on the terraza [sic.], she slipped and
fell on her right side, seriously injuring her upper
right arm and her right shoulder."

((The decisions of this court, as well as the
decisions of other courts, have very generally denied recovery in cases where persons have fallen on
smooth floors even when they are made slippery by
the presence of wax or water. A great many of
these cases are collected and discussed in Shumaker
v. Charada Investment Co., 183 Wash. 521,49 P.2d
44. Among the cases there cited is Kresge Co. v.
Fader, 116 Ohio St. 718, 158 N. E. 174, 175, 58
A.L.R. 132, from which we quote as follows: tit
is a fact known to all that many stores in all
branches of trade have an inside door or passageway
into the store, usually in the middle of the front.
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On each side of this passageway is a display window. The passage then extends back ten or twelve
feet or more to the entrance door to the store. This
passage usually has a slight slope from the door to
the sidewalk, at which line there is no door. This
slope is to carry away the rain that may blow into
the passageway. The passageway is in fact practically a part of the sidewalk, but at the same time
it is within the front line of the store, and under
control of the store. Would any one contend that,
if a person walked into such passageway when it
was raining, and there slipped and fell, he could
recover damages because there was moisture on the
floor of the passageway? Manifestly not. Everybody knows that, when people are entering any
building when it is raining, they will carry some
moisture on their feet, which will render the floor
near the door on the inside damp to some extent,
and every one knows that a damp floor is likely
to be a little more slippery than a dry floor. In
this instance Mrs. Fader knew that her own shoes
were wet when she went in there out of the rainstorm, and after walking on the wet sidewalk. Two
of her companions who preceded her crossed the
same wet spot as she did, and did not fall, and the
one of them who testified in the case said that he
did not turn and warn her about the wet spot, as
there was nothing about it to indicate to him that
it presented any danger-a very frank and a very
natural statement.'
((See, also, Cornwell v. S. S. Kresge Co., 112
W. Va. 237, 164 S.E. 156; Picman v. Higbee Co.,
54 Ohio App. 55, 6 N.E.2d 21; Anderson v. Seattle
Park Co., 79 Wash. 575, 140 P. 698; Mullen v.
Sensenbrenner Mercantile Co., Mo. Sup., 260 S.W.
982, 33 A.L.R. 176.
HW alking, although it becomes automatic by
long practice and use, is, after all, a highly compli-
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cated process. The body balance is maintained by
the co-ordination of many muscles, and their operation is controlled by an intricate system of
motor nerves, the failure of any of which for a
split second, on account of advancing age or for
some other reason, may cause a fall. It is cotnmon
knowledge that people fall on the best of sidewalks
and floors. A fall, therefore, does not, of itself,
tend to prove that the surface over which one is
walking is dangerously unfit for the purpose."
To the same effect the Circuit Court of Appeals of
the Tenth Circuit, in the case of Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
Johnson, 91 F.2d 332, reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, who had slipped on an allegedly wet and therefore
slippery floor of defendant's store, saying:
((From the record, it appears that when it is
raining in said city, some water is usually carried
into stores by parties going in and out, and that
those coming in from without on a wet day have
wet shoes.
((It is just as reasonable to infer that plaintiff
slipped because of wet shoes as on account of a
damp floor.
((Under either theory, the evidence is insufficient to make an issue as to negligence on the part
of defendant. The conditions complained of were
not shown to have existed for any length of time.
Whilst there is evidence that it was raining around
9:30 and 10 o'clock in the morning, its extent is
not stated although plaintiff should have been able
to state the extent.
((As to what period during the rain it was
sufficient to wet the streets so that the shoes of
persons entering the store would carry in water or
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mud, if at all, is not disclosed. The rain in the
beginning may have been merely a drizzle and
have gradually increased. So you cannot point out
with any reasonable certainty as to when or how
long, if at all, that floor was sufficiently wet as to
place the defendant on notice that it should receive
attention by mopping or otherwise.
((There was no evidence on part of plaintiff
that her shoes were not wet, and that information
was peculiarly within her knowledge."
((The fact that invitee may have slipped on the
floor of the store did not shift to defendant burden
of establishing that accident did not occur through
its negligence, nor create presumption of negligence. The presumption is that defendant exercised reasonable care, as respects liability for injury to plaintiff on account of slipping on floor.
Defendant was not an insurer against accidents to
persons entering the store for making purchases or
otherwise on invitation."
In Parsons v. H. L. Green Co., 10 N.W.2d 40, the
defendant store was charged with a slippery and unsafe
condition due to water, slush, snow and mud being allowed to collect and which condition defendant knew or
should have known existed. In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant store the Supreme Court of Iowa
stated:
((* ::- ::· We cannot say that a failure to follow
and remove immediately every deposit of snow that
is brought into a building can reasonably be held
to be a breach of duty which the inviter owes to
an invitee and so constitutes negligence. Such is
not the holding of the courts where this question
has arisen. To so require would demand an exercise of such extra-ordinary care as to be unreasonable."
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tt* * * In order that there shall be liability,
there must be some evidence of notice of the existing condition, either actual or constructive, and in
such time that the defendant in the exercise of
ordinary care could have remedied it. Snipps v.
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 164 Iowa 530, 146
N.W. 468, and cases cited. No evidence of such
knowledge appears in the record."

In Brunet v. S. S. Kresge Co., 115 F.2d 713, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed
the foregoing general rule:
HWe think the facts as proved by appellee fail
to disclose such a lack of reasonable and ordinary
care in the maintenance and supervision of the
premises as to render appellant liable for her accident. In the words of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in another case involving a fall on rather dark stairs wet from
tracked-in water:
tt (If what was shown in this case was sufficient to permit recovery, it would require store
owners to have a mopper stationed at the doors
on rainy days for the sole purpose of mopping up
after every customer entering or leaving the
premises. Every store owner would be required to
be an insurer against such accidents to public invitees who came in on rainy days with wet shoes.'
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 91 F.2d 332,
3 39."

Also, in Gallagher v. Children's Aid Soc. of Pennsylvania and Philadelphia, 23 A.2d 452, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, in affirming a nonsuit, where the plaintiff
fell due to wet condition in defendant's office building,
said:
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HThe case falls within the familiar rule that
negligence cannot be inferred from the mere happening of an accident. Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa.
117, 119, 6 A.2d 64. The mere happening of an
accident does not show that one party or the other
was at fault. McAvoy v. Kromer, 277 Pa. 196,
120 A. 762. Plaintiff's proofs were also deficient
in that she failed to show that the condition of
which she complained had existed for an unreasonable length of time so that defendant was put
on notice. MacDonald v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 321
Pa. 25, 183 A. 804; Bremer v. W. W. Smith, Inc.,
126 Pa.Super. 408, 411, 191 A. 395; Restatement,
Torts, Sec. 343."
See also: Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Lamberson,
144 F.2d 97, (C.C.A. 9th, 1944); Lander v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 44 A.2d 886 (S.Ct. Me., 1945); Dudley v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 192 P.2d 617 (S.Ct. Wyoming,
1948); Bersch v. Holton Street State Bank, 19 N.W.2d
175 (S.Ct.Wis., 1945); Spaulding v. Christakos, 68 N.E.
2d 55 (Ct. of App., N.Y., 1946) ; Grace v. Jordan Marsh
Co., 59 N.E.2d 283 (S.Ct., Mass., 1945).
A general rule of law is stated by Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Revised Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 798 at
page 1826:
((Water, slush and mud, tracked in upon a
floor by reason of weather conditions outside, although it renders the floor wet, dirty and slippery,
does not ordinarily create an actionable situation.
A wet and sloppy condition of the floor may be
necessarily incidental to the business or activity in
question."
This court has distinguished the case of Erickson v.
Walgreen Drug Co., supra, in the case of Lindsay v. Ec-
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cles Hotel Co-mpany, ________________ Ut. ________________ , 284 P.2d
477:
u* * * In other words, there was no evidence
as to how the water got onto the floor, by whom
it was deposited, exactly when it arrived there or

that the defendant had knowledge of its presence.
Under such circumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the defendant was negligent. A reading of plaintiff's authority makes
obvious the factual differences between that case
and its inapplicability to the one here." (Italics
ours)
There is no probative evidence in the record suffi-,
cient to establish that defendant knew or should have
known of any condition alleged by plaintiff to have ex-.
isted, or that such a condition had existed for such an un-1
reasonable length of time that defendant was put on notice thereof.
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POINT II.
PLAINTIFF WAS GUlLTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Plaintiff testified that when she walked into the entranceway of defendant's store,
ttA. I was just walking along normally, minding
my own business, and I noticed the floor was
wet, but never thought about it being slick
or anything like that.
HQ. And what happened?
HA. And the next thing I knew, I was down after
I had gone two or three feet inside the entrance." (R. 20)
The foyer was lighted. As pointed out above, there
was no affirmative evidence of any condition existing in
the entranceway. Any contention that the entranceway
was slippery, because common knowledge is alleged to
provide the information that terrazzo is slippery when
wet, charges plaintiff with that knowledge as equally as
the defendant. She was married to an Assistant Manager
of a store, who professed to know the propensities of
terrazzo and who testified that W. T. Grant's terrazzo in
all of the stores he worked was slippery when wet. The
plain fact is that she didn't think it was wet enough to
be dangerous (and it wasn't) and yet she seeks to hold
J. C. Penney for what they should have known was dangerous. If she maintains that a reasonable, prudent person would or could have recognized a dangerous condition, she thereby excludes herself from such a reasonable,
prudent category and convicts herself of contributory
negligence. She wore no galoshes, she recognized that
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precipitation did not begin until she was on her way to
town and that the sidewalks were damp only, with no
water in puddles or running on it. What she demands is
knowledge of or notice to defendant, should also be
knowledge or notice to herself. See Brunet v. S. S. Kresge,
supra, where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit stated:
u tFrom the testimony of the plaintiff it is
apparent that the danger, if any, was clearly evident to her, as well as the defendants, and that
she was aware of the condition and of the possibility of sustaining fall before she undertook to
pass over and along the floor space of the vestibule.

a

tt tThe condition described by the witnesses is
one that is not only not unusual, but is customarily
to be found on such days as described in the testimony, in vestibules of this character and the sidewalks and the premises surrounding entrances to
public places.* * *
u tin the case at bar the plaintiff was as well
apprised of the condition existing in the vestibule
as the defendant, and should be held to as high a
degree of care for her own safety as would be required of the defendant.'"
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IMPROPER
EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL.

The record reveals that plaintiff sought to influence
the jury by a constant and persistent line of questions and
testimony relating to the practice, custom and conditions of W. T. Grant stores in various localities in the
United States as well as Salt Lake. The beginning question was categorized by counsel as ((preliminary," and
then boldly asserted to be admissible as a standard of care:
uMR. BLACK. If your Honor, please, this has
to do with a standard of care-this is evidence of a
standard of care in connection with maintenance
and upkeep of terrazzo entrance-way.
((MR. AADNESEN: Just a minute, I objectHTHE COURT: Just a minute, no argumentHMR. AADNESEN: -object to the speech.
HTHE COURT: It may be evidence of a
standard of care that W. T. Grant takes, but I
don't see how it could be anything else." (R. 71)
In spite of some adverse rulings of the court an4
much discussion regarding the objectionable nature of the
questions, the line of questioning persisted until the pattern and effect became clearly prejudicial to the defendant. Mr. DeWeese was both directly and indirectly allowed to set a standard of care by comparison. Admittedly the defendant, J. C. Penney Company, used mats and
Feldspar during inclement weather, just as they were used
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by other stores on Main Street, including W. T. Grants.
But the implication arose that if W. T. Grants store had
placed mats in their entranceway at any given time, the
defendant J. C. Penney store was negligent in not having
also placed mats or used Feldspar in its entranceway. This
in effect was an attempt to charge the defendant, J. C.
Penney store, with constructive knowledge of a condition
existing on the premises of theW. T. Grant store. There
was no showing of similarity of conditions, which might
have provided some small glimmer of relevancy or materiality of such evidence. Rather, Mr. Caffall testified that
the terrazzo at the W. T. Grant store was different in
composition than that at the defendant's store. The fact
that defendant's entrance was a covered foyer, while
W. T. Grant's entranceway might have been quite as
fully exposed as the sidewalk to inclement weather (which
casual observance reveals) , was not considered nor proffered.

It is evident from the complaint filed by the plaintiff and from the evidence introduced by her, that the
defendant's store was not charged with failure to possess
mats or Feldspar or to accede to any custom or usage
thereof-but with failure to put such out at a time the
defendant's store purportedly knew or should have known
such were required. To attempt to establish such a standard of care by comparison is contrary to the law of this
state and the overwhelming general rule of law in the
United States. Such a standard is a substantive rule of
law to be determined by the court. This is well stated
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
the case o(Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118
F.2d 836:
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((If the evidence is admitted and the jury is
admonished, either at the time it is admitted or by
proper instruction in connection with its admission, that it was admitted merely to show what precautions were generally taken in such cases as
bearing upon the degree of care enjoined upon the
defendant by his relationship to the plaintiff, we
think the evidence is admissible for this purpose.
Pence v. California Mining Company, 27 Utah
378, 75 P. 934. To this extent it is not admitted
for the purpose of showing a custom or to establish a rule of conduct by com-Parison." (Italics
ours)
((~- ~- ~~ If the introduction of the testimony
would result in a confusion of issues, or inject many
new controversial points collateral to the issues,
or if it would tend to generate surprise, or undue
prejudice disproportionate to the usefulness of the
evidence, it should not be admitted."

The testimony admitted in evidence was not explained by the court as to its purpose, nor was it commented on in the instructions. The foregoing standard
of care is discussed by the court in Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
Co. v. Bryant's Admr., 114 S. W.2d 89, at page 92:
tt:-.. ~- ~- The standard is a matter of law, not of
fact. If the presence or absence of a duty to the
plaintiff were left to the judgment of a jury, no
defendant could be held to know in advance the
duties required of him.

((Holmes points out that the law has not only
fixed general standards, but, where the courts have
felt themselves on safe ground, specific standards
for particular circumstances. He continues:
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u elf, now, the ordinary liabilities in tort arise
from the failure to comply with fixed and uniform
standards of external conduct, which every man
is presumed and required to know, it is obvious that
it ought to be possible, sooner or later, to formulate
these standards at least to some extent, and that
to do so must at last be the business of the court.
It is equally clear that the featureless generality,
that the defendant was bound to use such care as a
prudent man would do under the circumstances,
ought to be continually giving place to the specific
one, that he was bound to use this or that precaution under these or those circumstances. The
standard which the defendant was bound to come
up to was a standard of specific acts or omissions,
with reference to the specific circumstances in
which he found himself. If in the whole department of unintentional wrongs the courts arrived
at no further utterance than the question of negligence, and left every case, without rudder or compass, to the jury, they would simply confess their
inability to state a very large part of the law which
they required the defendant to know, and would
assert, by implication, that nothing could be
learned by experience. But neither courts nor
legislatures have ever stopped at that point.
cc cFrom the time of Alfred to the present day,
statutes and decisions have busied themselves with
defining the precautions to be taken in certain
familiar cases; that is, with substituting for the
vague test of the care exercised by a prudent man,
a precise one of specific acts or omissions. The
fundamental thought is still the same, that the way
prescribed is that in which prudent men are in the
habit of acting, or else is one laid down for cases
where prudent men might otherwise be in doubt.' "

Testimony admitted at the trial and persisted in by
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questions which imported the purpose therefor, appears
in such abundance in the record that it would unduly
encumber this brief to duplicate it here. Specifically, the
thirteen pages of testimony of Hugh DeWeese, from pages
66 to 79 in the record, illustrate the pattern of the questions and contain the objectionable questions and answers.
This pattern is further illustrated by the testimony of
Frank Ca:tliall on pages 97 and 98 of the record:
t(Q. Have you made a particular examination at
my request of the terrazzo entrance-way to
W. T. Grant and Company?

((A. Yes.
t(Q. Can you state, from your observation of that
entrance-way whether there is carborundum
and a London grit in that?
uMR. AADNESEN: Object to it as immaterial.
uTHE COURT: He may answer that with a eyes'
or (no'. Doesn't ask him whether there is or
not.
uQ. Did you make an observation on that?

((A. Yes.
ceQ. What did your observation reveal?
uMR. AADNESEN: Object to it, your Honor, as
immaterial.
uA. Do you mean as to the((MR. AADNESEN: My objection-just a momentuTHE COURT: I think the question is objectionable in the form it is asked.
ceQ. Did you observe whether that substance had
an abrasive in it-that terrazzo surface at
W. T. Grant's?
uMR. AADNESEN: Object to it again as immaterial.
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((THE COURT: He may answer that.
HQ. Will you answer, please?
((A. The material that is in thereHTHE COURT: That may be answered with eyes'
or (no'.
etA. Oh, eyes' or cno'?
HQ. Did you make that observation?
ccA. Yes.
ceQ. What did that observation reveal?
((MR. AADNESEN: That's what my objection
goes to, your Honor.
((THE COURT: He may answer that.
ccA. The floor that is in there now has carborundum on it; the borderceQ. You are talking about J. C. Penney's entrance
now, aren't you?
((A. Yes.
ceQ. I am talking about W. T. Grant-entrance to
Grant's store at the present time, Mr. Caffall.
etA. Oh, yes, that has London grits in it.
HQ. How much does it have in it?
ccA. I couldn't tell the percentage-quite a lot of
it.
((MR. AADNESEN: May my record show that
my objection goes to this entire line as to
what W. T. Grant has?
((THE COURT: Yes.
((Q. Did you make an observation of that surface
to determine the effect that water or moisture
would have on it.
((MR. AADNESEN: Objected to as immaterial.
((THE COURT: That objection will be sustained."
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CONCLUSION
There was insufficient evidence adduced at the trial
to support the verdict for the plaintiff. No affirmative·
evidence of a slippery condition was introduced and even
an inference -is fairly rebutted by the scientific measurements and evidence indicating that the terrazzo where
Mrs. DeWeese fell corresponded in slipperiness to that of
the sidewalk in front of the store. Further, reasonable
minds could not differ that the short period of time elapsing from the beginning of precipitation and the fall of
the plaintiff was not of sufficient duration nor intensity
to put defendant upon notice of the existence of any condition which might have been hazardous to the plaintiff.
In fact, all the circumstances, conditions and times are so
limited that the trial court was required to grant either
defendant's motion for an involuntary dismissal or defendant's motion for a directed verdict. In like manner,
if any negligence could possibly have been held to have
existed on the part of the defendant, the trial court should
have held plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law.
The persistent and constant attempt by the plaintiff
to set up the purported actions, customs and conditions
of W. T. Grant's store in order to establish a standard of
care by comparison, was highly prejudicial to defendant.
The error in admitting such evidence was sufficient to
grant defendant a new trial, even though it appears that
without such evidence there exists no other evidence of
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probative value sufficient to support a verdict for the
plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
GRANT C. AADNESEN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant.
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